

The communication complexity of addition, with applications

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- 2-player addition

Player P_1 gets integer $x_1 \in [-2^n, 2^n]$

P_2 x_2

How many communication bits to decide if $x_1 + x_2 > 0$
with error 1%?

Public-coin: A random string is shared

- 2-player addition ($x_1 + x_2 > 0?$, $x_i \in [-2^n, 2^n]$)

[Nisan Safra '93] $O(\log n)$

Idea: ?

- 2-player addition ($x_1 + x_2 > 0?$, $x_i \in [-2^n, 2^n]$)

[Nisan Safra '93] $O(\log n)$

Idea: Compute $\max i : (x_1)_i \neq (x_2)_i$
Binary search on bits, run equality at each step.

Implementation:

Equality with $O(1)$ communication, **error 1%**
Binary search **with noise**; $O(\log n)$ steps still suffice

- 2-player addition ($x_1 + x_2 > 0?$, $x_i \in [-2^n, 2^n]$)

[Smirnoff '88] $\Omega(\sqrt{\log n})$

[Nisan Safra '93] $O(\log n)$

This work: $\Omega(\log n)$

Corollary: $\Theta(\log n)$

- 2-player addition ($x_1 + x_2 > 0?$, $x_i \in [-2^n, 2^n]$)

Proof of $\Omega(\log n)$ lower bound:

Hard distributions: $I \in [n]$ uniform $Y \in \{0,1\}^n$ uniform

$$G = (G_1, G_2) = (Y_1 Y_2 \dots Y_n, Y_1 Y_2 \dots Y_1 \ 0 \ 0 \dots 0)$$

$$B = (B_1, B_2) = (Y_1 Y_2 \dots Y_n, Y_1 Y_2 \dots (1-Y_1) \ 0 \ 0 \dots 0)$$

$G_1 \geq G_2$ always; $B_1 \geq B_2$ with probability $1/2$

Claim: For every rectangle $R = R_1 \times R_2$ s. t. $\Pr[G \in R] \geq 1/n$

We have $\Pr[B \in R] \geq \Pr[G \in R] - 1/n^{0.3}$

Proof: Conditioned on $G_1 \in R_1$, $H(Y) \geq n - \log n$,

So Y_1 has entropy $\geq 1 - \log(n)/n$, so $Y_1 \approx \text{uniform} \approx 1-Y_1$ ■

- 2-player addition ($x_1 + x_2 > 0?$, $x_i \in [-2^n, 2^n]$)
- [Nisan Safra '93] $O(\log n)$ + [Newman '91]
→ $O(\log n)$ communication, private-coin, not explicit
- This work: $O(\log n)$ communication, private-coin, explicit

Proof: Use small-bias generator for equality

Use space-bounded generator for binary search



Detour application I [Dutta Pandurangan Rajaraman Sun V.]

Problem: Two players, each holding a subset x_i of $[n]$.

Want ε -uniform element from symmetric difference $x_1 \oplus x_2$

Part of [DPRS^V] proposal for spreading on dynamic networks

Claim: Explicit, private-coin protocol with $\sim O(\log n / \varepsilon)$ comm.

Proof:

?????

Detour application I [Dutta Pandurangan Rajaraman Sun V.]

Problem: Two players, each holding a subset x_i of $[n]$.

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Claim: Explicit, private-coin protocol with $\sim O(\log n / \varepsilon)$ comm.

Proof:

Players agree on uniform permutation π .

Run Nisan-Safra protocol on $\pi(x_1) \oplus \pi(x_2)$

π : pseudorandom generators for combinatorial rectangles

[Gopalan Meka Reingold Trevisan Vadhan]



Detour application II

Is multiplication
harder than addition?

Cobham 1964

- 2-player multiplication

Player P_1 gets integer $x_1 \in [-2^n, 2^n]$

P_2 x_2

How many communication bits to decide if $x_1 \cdot x_2 > 2^{n/2}$
with error 1%?

Do you know how to solve this?

- 2-player multiplication

Player P_1 gets integer $x_1 \in [-2^n, 2^n]$

P_2 x_2

How many communication bits to decide if $x_1 \cdot x_2 > 2^{n/2}$
with error 1%?

Corollary [V]: $O(\log n)$ communication

Proof:

Take logs

Results on logarithmic forms by Baker et al. imply that you can truncate after $\text{poly}(n)$ digits.

Run protocol for addition. ■

Outline

- Results for 2 players
- Results for k players
- Proof of $O(\log n)$ bound for k -player addition

- **k**-player addition

Player P_i gets $x_i \in [-2^n, 2^n]$, $i=1, \dots, k$; (number-in-hand)

How much communication to decide $\sum_{i \leq k} x_i > 0$ with error 1%?

- From now on, public-coin model

For simplicity, $k = O(1)$

- k-player addition ($\sum_i x_i > 0?$, $x_i \in [-2^n, 2^n]$, $k = O(1)$)

[Nisan '93] $O(\log^2 n)$

This work: $O(\log n)$

Corollary: $\Theta(\log n)$

- Degree- d polynomial-threshold function in n variables
How much communication for number-on-forehead protocols among $k = d+1$ players?

Corollaries to k -player addition:

[Nisan '93] $O(\log^2 n)$

This work: $O(\log n)$

- Application to the complexity of pseudorandom functions

Table 1: Pseudorandom functions $F : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ computable by circuits of size $\text{poly}(n)$ and depth $O(1)$.

Complexity class	Security	Reference
TC^0	Secure against time $t = t(n)$ under assumptions in [NR04] against times $\text{poly}(n)t(n)$	[NR04, NRR02]
AC^0 with Mod m gates, any m ; CC^0	Secure against time $n^{\lg^c n}$ under assumptions in [NR04] against time $2^{n^{\Omega(1)}}$ (circuit depth depends on c)	Theorem 11
AC^0 with Mod m gates, prime m	Breakable in time $n^{\lg^c n}$ (c depends on circuit depth)	[RR97, KL01]
AC^0 with $O(1)$ threshold gates and $O(1)$ symmetric gates (e.g. parity, majority)	Breakable in time $\text{poly}(n)$	Theorem 10
AC^0	Breakable in time $\text{poly}(n)$	[LMN93]

Claim: AC^0 with 1 threshold gate is breakable in $\text{poly}(n)$ time

Note: Previously quasi-polynomial time was known.

Proof:

Hit AC^0 with a random restriction.

It collapses to a polynomial threshold function of degree $O(1)$

By previous fact, it has $O(\log n)$ communication (error 1%)

This means that the Babai-Nisan-Szegedy “norm” R
(see Chung Tetali, Raz, \forall Wigderson) is $\geq ?$

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By previous fact, it has $O(\log n)$ communication (error 1%)

This means that the Babai-Nisan-Szegedy “norm” R (see Chung Tetali, Raz, \forall Wigderson) is $\geq 1/\text{poly}(n)$

Whereas for a random function R is negligible

This difference can be detected in polynomial time. ■

Outline

- Results for 2 players
- Results for k players
- Proof of $O(\log n)$ bound for k-player addition

- Recall k-player addition:

P_i gets integer $x_i \in [-2^n, 2^n]$

How much communication to decide $\sum_{i \leq k} x_i > 0$ with error 1%?

- Overview of ideas in our $O(\log n)$ protocol
 - We give $O(1)$ protocol for k-player **sum-equal**, improving on Nisan's $O(\log n)$
 - Using a recursion [Nisan] this gives $O(\log n \log \log n)$ protocol for k-player addition
 - We adapt [Nisan Safra] from $k = 2$ to $k > 2$ to obtain $O(\log n)$

- k-player sum-equal

Player P_i gets integer $x_i \in [-2^n, 2^n]$


How much communication to decide $\sum_{i \leq k} x_i = 0$ with error 1%?

- **k-player sum-equal** ($\sum_{i \leq k} x_i = 0?$, $x_i \in [-2^n, 2^n]$)
- [Nisan] Player P_i communicates $\text{hash}(x_i) = x_i \bmod p$
 Correctness by linearity: $\sum_i (x_i \bmod p) = (\sum_i x_i) \bmod p$
 Need $p = n^{\Omega(1)} \rightarrow \Omega(\log n)$ -bit hashes
- This work: Use hash function analyzed by
 [Dietzfelbinger Hagerup Katajainen Penttonen]


$\text{hash}(x_i) = \text{"O(1) middle bits of } R \cdot x_i, R \text{ random odd"}$

Almost linear: $\sum_{i \leq k} \text{hash}(x_i) = \text{hash}(\sum_{i \leq k} x_i) \pm k$
O(1)-bit hashes

- [Nisan] Solving addition using **sum-equal**:



- At each node solve $O(1)$ **sum-equal**, to determine if sum of lower halves matters or not.
- Depth of tree = $O(\log n)$
- Naively, for total error 1% need to solve each **sum-equal** with error $\leq 1/\log n \rightarrow O(\log n \log \log n)$ protocol



- [Nisan Safra] obtain $O(\log n)$ for $k=2$ players using **binary search with noise**
- Exploits geometry not present for $k > 2$
- We show how to use binary search with noise for any k : write **sum-equal** questions along a path as single question

Summary

2-player addition: $\Theta(\log n)$, improves Smirnov's '88 $\Omega(\sqrt{\log n})$

k-player addition: $\Theta(\log n)$, improves Nisan's '93 $O(\log^2 n)$

Useful for polynomial-threshold functions,

complexity of pseudorandom functions,

[Dutta Pandurangan Rajaraman Sun V.]

multiplication

Open problems

- For large number k of players:

We show sum-equal **mod p** is $\Theta(k \log k)$

Over integers only know $O(k \log k)$, $\Omega(k)$

- Recall for 2-player addition we gave $O(\log n)$ protocol
private-coin and explicit

Not known for $k > 2$ players.

One approach would be to derandomize the hash function