

The multiparty communication complexity of interleaved group products

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Joint work with Timothy Gowers

Number-on-forehead communication

[Yao, Chandra Furst Lipton '83]

- k parties wish to compute function of k inputs
- Party i knows all but i -th input (on forehead)
- Fascinating, useful, and challenging model




Interleaved products in group G

[Miles V]

• Alice: $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_t \in G$

Bob: $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_t \in G$

Clio: $c_1, c_2, \dots, c_t \in G$



• Decide if $a_1 b_1 c_1 a_2 b_2 c_2 \cdots a_t b_t c_t = 1_G$ or $= h$

• Communication:

G abelian: ???


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G abelian: $O(1)$

G non-solvable: ???

reduce to equality


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• Communication:

G abelian: $O(1)$ reduce to equality

G non-solvable: $\Omega(t/2^k)$, k parties [Babai Nisan Szegedy
Barrington]


• Question: Improve for large $|G|$? $\Omega(t/2^k) \log |G|$?

Previous work for $k = 2$ parties

[Gowers V]

- Alice: $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_t \in G$

- Bob: $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_t \in G$



- Decide if $a_1 b_1 a_2 b_2 \cdots a_t b_t = 1_G$ or $= h$

- **Theorem:** Communication complexity

- $\Omega(t) \log |G|$ for $G = \text{SL}(2, q) = 2 \times 2$ matrices in F_q

- $\omega(1)$ for G simple, non-abelian


- [Shalev] quantifies ω

This work

- Alice: $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_t \in G$

- Bob: $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_t \in G$

- Clio: $c_1, c_2, \dots, c_t \in G$



- Decide if $a_1 b_1 c_1 a_2 b_2 c_2 \cdots a_t b_t c_t = 1_G$ or $= h$

- **Theorem** Communication $\Omega(t / 2^{2^k}) \log |G|$

With k parties, $G = \text{SL}(2, q)$, and $t \geq 2^{2^k}$

Tight for $k = O(1)$

Outline

- Communication complexity
- Cryptography
- Boosting independence, proofs

Cryptographic application

[Miles V 2013]

- Leakage-resilient circuits based on group products
 - Secure in computationally-bounded model
 - Secure in “only computation leaks” [Micali Reyzin]
assuming $\Omega(t) \log |G|$ bound for 8 parties

Cryptographic application

[Miles V 2013]

- Leakage-resilient circuits based on group products
 - Secure in computationally-bounded model
 - Secure in “only computation leaks” [Micali Reyzin]
~~assuming $\Omega(t) \log |G|$ bound for 8 parties~~
using $\Omega(t) \log |G|$ bound for 8 parties in this work


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- Communication complexity
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- Boosting independence, proofs

Boosting independence

• **Lemma:** $\forall m \exists s : G = \text{SL}(2, q)$,

D_1, D_2, \dots, D_s independent distributions on G^m
each D_i pairwise independent.



$D = D_1 \cdot D_2 \cdots D_s$ close to uniform:

$$\forall g \in G^m, \left| \Pr[D = g] - 1/|G|^m \right| \leq \varepsilon / |G|^m$$

• Can be proved using result for $k = 2$ parties

Boosting independence \rightarrow lower bound

- Recall $P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{c}) = a_1 b_1 c_1 a_2 b_2 c_2 \cdots a_t b_t c_t$
Goal: hard to tell $P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{c}) = 1_G$ from $P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{c}) = h$
- Define $f(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{c}) = 1 / -1 / 0$ if $P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{c}) = 1_G / h /$ else
- [BNS, CT, R, VW] Enough to bound,
for uniform $\mathbf{a}^0, \mathbf{a}^1, \mathbf{b}^0, \mathbf{b}^1, \mathbf{c}^0, \mathbf{c}^1 \in G^t$,
$$E [f(\mathbf{a}^0, \mathbf{b}^0, \mathbf{c}^0) \cdot f(\mathbf{a}^0, \mathbf{b}^0, \mathbf{c}^1) \cdot f(\mathbf{a}^0, \mathbf{b}^1, \mathbf{c}^0) \cdot f(\mathbf{a}^0, \mathbf{b}^1, \mathbf{c}^1) \cdot$$
$$f(\mathbf{a}^1, \mathbf{b}^0, \mathbf{c}^0) \cdot f(\mathbf{a}^1, \mathbf{b}^0, \mathbf{c}^1) \cdot f(\mathbf{a}^1, \mathbf{b}^1, \mathbf{c}^0) \cdot f(\mathbf{a}^1, \mathbf{b}^1, \mathbf{c}^1)]$$
- Prove stronger: the 8 factors nearly independent

Boosting independence \rightarrow lower bound

- Recall $P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{c}) = a_1 b_1 c_1 a_2 b_2 c_2 \cdots a_t b_t c_t$

- Prove stronger result:

$D(t) :=$

$(P(\mathbf{a}^0, \mathbf{b}^0, \mathbf{c}^0), P(\mathbf{a}^0, \mathbf{b}^0, \mathbf{c}^1), P(\mathbf{a}^0, \mathbf{b}^1, \mathbf{c}^0), P(\mathbf{a}^0, \mathbf{b}^1, \mathbf{c}^1))$

$P(\mathbf{a}^1, \mathbf{b}^0, \mathbf{c}^0), P(\mathbf{a}^1, \mathbf{b}^0, \mathbf{c}^1), P(\mathbf{a}^1, \mathbf{b}^1, \mathbf{c}^0), P(\mathbf{a}^1, \mathbf{b}^1, \mathbf{c}^1) \in G^8$

is nearly uniform over G^8

- Proof:

$D(t) =$ product of s independent copies of $D(t/s) \in G^8$
each copy pairwise independent

Boosting independence lemma



Future work

- Improve $\Omega(t / 2^{2^k}) \log |G|$ to $\Omega(t/2^k) \log |G|$
- **Conjecture** [Gowers V] $\sim \Omega(t)$ even for $k > \log t$
- Tight bounds for boosting independence
- Extend to other groups

Summary

- Interleaved group products over $G = \text{SL}(2, q)$

$$a_1 b_1 c_1 a_2 b_2 c_2 \cdots a_t b_t c_t$$

- Communication $\Omega(t) \log |G|$ for $O(1)$ parties, tight

- [Miles V] secure even in “only-computation leaks”

- Boosting independence:

Independent distributions D_1, D_2, \dots, D_s in G^m

Each D_i pairwise indep. $\rightarrow D_1 D_2 \cdots D_s \approx \text{uniform}$