Northeastern University

International Secure Systems Lab

A Large-Scale, Automated Approach to Detecting Ransomware

Amin Kharraz, Sajjad Arshad, Collin Mulliner,
William Robertson, Engin Kirda

Attacks on School Districts

CRIME • NEWS

US School District Paralyzed By 500 BTC Ransomware Attack

Stan Higgins | Published on March 24, 2015 at 22:31 BST

NEWS

8 37 3

A bitcoin ransomware attack on a New Jersey school district has grown into an investigation involving multiple US government agencies.

The Swedesboro-Woolwich School District, which encompasses four elementary schools in Gloucester County, New Jersey, was forced to delay a statewide standardized test earlier this week after the ransomware was discovered over the weekend.

Home ▸ Tewksbury Town Crier ▸ News

Police pay ransom after cyberterror attack on network

Story | Comments (1) | Print | Font Size:

Thomas Murphy, Daniel Sawicki and Lt. Scott Keddie

Posted: Saturday, April 4, 2015 10:27 am

By Jayne W. Miller News Editor
Jayne@YourTownCrier.com | 1 comment

Chief: "Paying ransom was the last resort"

TEWKSBURY – Last December Tewksbury Police confronted a new, and growing, frontier in cyberterrorism when the CryptoLocker ransomware virus infected the department's network, encrypting essential department files until the town paid a $500 bitcoin ransom. In total, police systems were down between four and five days as the department worked with the FBI, Homeland Security, Massachusetts State Police, as well as private firms in an effort to restore their data without paying the ransom.

Attacks on Hospitals

Public Service Announcement

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

"Between April 2014 and June 2015, the IC3 received 992 CryptoWall-related complaints, with victims reporting losses totaling over $18 million."

– FBI Security Bulletin, June 2015

What is a ransomware attack?

1 Infecting the machine

Attachments

Drive-by Downloads

Malicious binaries

A Typical Ransom Note

What is a ransomware attack?

❷ Paying the ransom fee

What is a ransomware attack?

❸ Receiving the decryption key



What is a ransomware attack?

❹ **Unlocking the machine**



How to defend against ransomware attacks?

- Educating end-users
  - Have a reliable *backup* policy
  - Avoid risky browsing
- Developing *detection* tools to assist defenders
  - Providing insight from *internal* behavior
- Developing *protection* tools to enhance AV capabilities
  - Stopping the attack, and keeping the data consistent

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But, How can we detect a ransomware sample?

Achilles' Heel of Ransomware

- Ransomware *has to inform* victim that attack has taken place
  - Behavior inherent in its nature
- Ransomware has certain behaviors that are predictable
  - e.g., entropy changes, modal dialogs and background activity, accessing "honey" files
- A good sandbox that looks for some of these signs helps here…

UNVEIL: An Early Warning Dynamic Detection System for Ransomware

Approach

- Detecting ransomware based on two techniques:
  - 1) Crypto-style Ransomware
    - Generating a fake (and attractive) user environment
    - Finding a reliable method for monitoring filesystem activity
  - 2) Desktop Locker
    - Going after the ransom note and using heuristics to detect such a message to the user

Generating Fake (Honey) Content

- Real files with valid headers
  - Using standard libraries (e.g., *python- docx, python-pptx, OpenSSL*)
  - Content that appears meaningful
  - File names do not look random, and appear realistic
- File paths
  - User's directory structure is generated randomly, but meaningfully
- File attributes
  - Generate content with different creation, modification, and access times



UNVEIL's Architecture


Content Generator
XLS
PNG
BAT
DOC
COM
MPG
MP3
INI
JPG
EXE
User
I/O MANAGER
Kernel
UNVEIL



$$R_{fs} = \langle Time, P_{name}, P_{id}, PP_{id}, IRP_{flag}, Arg, Result, Buf_{Entropy} \rangle$$

1 Reading user's file content



2 Writing encrypted data on the file



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

2 Creating a new file, and writing encrypted data to it



3 Deleting the original file



3 Or, overwriting the original file



Extracting I/O Access Sequences



(1) Overwrites the users' file with an encrypted version

(2) reads, encrypts and deletes files without wiping them from storage

(3) reads, creates a new encrypted version, and securely deletes the original files

IO Access Sequences in Multiple Ransomware Families

Ransomware Family	IRP Operation	Process	Filename	File Offset	Entropy	Description
CryptoWall	IRP_MJ_CREATE	explorer.exe	honeyfile.doc			Read, write
	IRP_MJ_READ	explorer.exe	honeyfile.doc	[0, 4096)	4.21	
	IRP_MJ_WRITE	explorer.exe	honeyfile.doc	[0, 4096)	7.11	
	...					
	IRP_MJ_CLEANUP	explorer.exe	honeyfile.doc			
	IRP_MJ_CLOSE	explorer.exe	honeyfile.doc			
FileCoder	IRP_MJ_CREATE	svchost.exe	honeyfile.doc			Read
	IRP_MJ_CREATE	svchost.exe	honeyfile.doc.crypt			Read, write
	IRP_MJ_READ	svchost.exe	honeyfile.doc	[0, 4096)	4.21	
	IRP_MJ_WRITE	svchost.exe	honeyfile.doc.crypt	[0, 4096)	7.02	
	...					
	IRP_MJ_CLEANUP	svchost.exe	honeyfile.doc			
	IRP_MJ_CLOSE	svchost.exe	honeyfile.doc			
	IRP_MJ_CREATE	svchost.exe	honeyfile.doc			Read attributes, delete
	IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION	svchost.exe	honeyfile.doc			
	IRP_MJ_CLEANUP	svchost.exe	honeyfile.doc			
	IRP_MJ_CLOSE	svchost.exe	honeyfile.doc			
	IRP_MJ_CLOSE	svchost.exe	honeyfile.doc.crypt			
CrypVault	IRP_MJ_CREATE	explorer.exe	balance.doc			Read
	IRP_MJ_CREATE	explorer.exe	balance.doc.vault			Read, write
	IRP_MJ_READ	explorer.exe	balance.doc	[0, 41014)	4.33	
	IRP_MJ_WRITE	explorer.exe	balance.doc.vault	[0, 41014)	7.14	
	...					
	IRP_MJ_CLEANUP	explorer.exe	balance.doc			
	IRP_MJ_CLOSE	explorer.exe	balance.doc			
	IRP_MJ_CREATE	explorer.exe	balance.doc			Write
	IRP_MJ_WRITE	explorer.exe	balance.doc	[0, 4096)	4.02	
	IRP_MJ_WRITE	explorer.exe	balance.doc	[4096, 8192)	4.02	
	...					
	IRP_MJ_CLOSE	explorer.exe	balance.doc.vault			
	IRP_MJ_SET_CREATE	explorer.exe	balance.doc			Read attributes, delete
	IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION	explorer.exe	balance.doc			

Desktop Locker Ransomware



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

Desktop Locker Ransomware



1) Detecting known ransomware samples

a) Collecting ~3500 ransomware from public repo, Anubis, two security companies.
b) 149 benign executables including ransomware-like behavior
c) 348 malware samples from 36 malware families

Benign Applications

Application	Main Capability	Version
7-zip	Compression	15.06
Winzip	Compression	19.5
WinRAR	Compression	5.21
DiskCryptor	Encryption	1.1.846.118
AESCrypt	Encryption	—
Eraser	Shredder	6.2.0.2969
SDelete	Shredder	1.61

Ransomware Families

Family	Samples
Cryptolocker	33 (1.7%)
CryptoWall	42 (2.2%)
CTB-Locker	77 (4.0%)
CrypVault	21 (1.1%)
Filecoder	19 (1.0%)
Reveton	501 (26.03%)
Tobfy	357 (18.6%)
Urausy	877 (45.6%)
Total Samples	**1,926**

Finding the best threshold value



Detecting known ransomware samples



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

Detecting known ransomware samples



The threshold value t = 0.32 gives the highest recall with 100% precision

Large-Scale Evaluation

~ 1200 malware samples per day



Large-Scale Evaluation

- We used the same similarity threshold (t = 0.32) for the large scale experiment.
- The incoming samples were acquired from the daily malware feed provided by Anubis from March 18 to February 12, 2016.
- The dataset contained 148,223 distinct samples.



Cross-checking with VirusTotal



- The results are concentrated either towards small or very large detection ratios.
- A sample is either detected by a relatively small number, or almost all of the scanners.

Detection Results

Evaluation	Results
Total Samples	148,223
Detected Ransomware	13,637 (9.2%)
Detection Rate	96.3%
False Positives	0.0%
New Detection	9,872 (72.2%)

Detection: New Ransomware Family

- During our experiments, we discovered a new malware family
  - We call it “SilentCrypt”
  - After we reported it, others started detecting it as well
  - We were not able to find any information about this family online
  - The ransomware first checks for private files of a user, contacts the C&C server, and starts the attack based on the answer

Detection: New Ransomware Family



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

Conclusion

- Defending against ransomware is not as *complex* as it is reported.
- Current analysis systems are not still ready to detect evasive ransomware attacks.
- UNVEIL is the introduction of concrete techniques to detect ransomware.
- SilentCrypt shows that AV industry is not still ready to detect *evasive* samples.

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Thank You