Hookway, Christopher. Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism - Themes from Peirce. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Oxford Scholarship Online. Oxford University Press. 27 September 2009 1 Belief, Confidence, and the Method of Science Christopher Hookway A discussion of Peirce's claim that belief has no place in science and his views of the different roles of rational self-control in dealing with scientific matters and with ‘vital questions’. This appears to be in conflict with Peirce's defence of the scientific method as the best method for the fixation of belief. There is also discussion of Peirce's claim that the laws of logic are regulative ideas, or hopes. Keywords: fixation of belief, hope, Peirce, practices, regulative idea, scientific method, theory, vital questions doi:10.1093/0199256586.003.0002 Free article: http://www.wehavephotoshop.com/PHILOSOPHY%20NOW/PHILOSOPHY/Peirce/Philosophy.of.Science.-.Peirce.&.Belief.&.Method.%28Ch..Hookway,.1993%29.pdf Consider the model of inquiry found in the first of the Illustrations of the Logic of Science, "The Fixation of Belief." Belief is a settled state, a stable disposition to act; so long as we are confident of a currently accepted belief, we see no need to doubt it or to inquire further into the grounds of its truth. Inquiry is always motivated by surprise, usually perceptual surprise, which disrupts our harmonious system of beliefs, converting stable belief into living doubt. Doubt is an unsettled state prompting inquiry directed at its elimination; the goal of the inquiry is, simply, replacement of doubt by settled belief in the truth or falsity of the disputed proposition. Hence anything we currently believe is taken as prima facie acceptable; it has a presumption in its favour. It is clear that this picture is intended to apply to scientific inquiries as well as to common-sense ones. How should we formulate the "no-belief thesis? We are to consider an agent A who carries out scientific investigations. He proposes the hypothesis H, and tests it rigorously, eventually deciding that no further testing is required: the hypothesis is "established truth." The strongest version of the thesis holds: I. It is wrong for A to believe H. Such inquirers must address questions of two distinct (but confusingly similar) kinds. First: has a particular proposal survived rigorous test sufficiently well that we may exempt it from further test for the time being and use it in theory construction and experimental design? Second: has the proposal been tested sufficiently that we may take it as "established," applying it in our engineering or surgical practice. Peirce ought to hold that only the first of these is a properly scientific question; once we address the second, we enter the realm where reason is rationalization and instinct and sentiment rule. Logical self-control can be our guide in the first but not in the second. =========================================================== http://lilt.ilstu.edu/gmklass/foi/readings/high_school_and_college.html Material that is presented on the basis of rational justification is presented as belief, as theory, as hypothesis, sometimes as conjecture--as material supported to a greater and lesser degree by argument and evidence. And this difference in mode of presentation makes an enormous difference in how the material is regarded. What is treated in high school as eternal and unchangeable fact that human beings have discovered in their continual and relentless progress toward total knowledge will be treated in college as belief that may perhaps be well supported at the present but that could turn out to be wrong. Another way of putting this is: what is fact in high school is often only theory--perhaps well-supported theory but nevertheless only theory--in college. And theories must be treated as such: one must examine the evidence to see how much support it gives the theory; and alternative theories must be examined to see which is better, that is, to see which theory should be believed. See basis of belief ====================================================================== http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ The "mind-body problem", for example, so central to philosophy of mind, is in part the question of whether and how a purely physical organism can have beliefs. Much of epistemology revolves around questions about when and how our beliefs are justified or qualify as knowledge. How can software agents have beliefs?