

How Tracking Companies Circumvented Ad Blockers Using WebSockets

Muhammad Ahmad Bashir, Sajjad Arshad, Engin Kirda,
William Robertson, Christo Wilson

Northeastern University

Online Tracking

Online Tracking

Surge in online advertising (internet economy)

- Ad networks pour in billions of dollars.
- Value for their investment?
 - Extensive tracking to serve targeted ads.

Online Tracking

Surge in online advertising (internet economy)

- Ad networks pour in billions of dollars.
- Value for their investment?
 - Extensive tracking to serve targeted ads.

User concern over tracking

- Led to the proliferation of ad blocking extensions

Online Tracking

Surge in online advertising (internet economy)

- Ad networks pour in billions of dollars.
- Value for their investment?
 - Extensive tracking to serve targeted ads.

User concern over tracking

- Led to the proliferation of ad blocking extensions

Ad networks fight back

- E.g Using anti ad blocking scripts

Google & Safari

- Google evaded Safari's third-party cookie blocking policy (Jonathan Mayer)
- ... by submitting a form in an invisible iFrame
- Google was fined \$22.5M by FTC

This Talk

How **Ad Networks** leveraged a bug in Chrome API to **bypass Ad Blockers** using **WebSockets**

This Talk

How **Ad Networks** leveraged a bug in Chrome API to **bypass Ad Blockers** using **WebSockets**

1. What caused this?
2. How this bug was leveraged by ad networks?

Web Sockets

Web Sockets

HTTP/S



Web Sockets

HTTP/S



Web Sockets

HTTP/S



request



response



Chatting App



Web Sockets

HTTP/S



Web Sockets

HTTP/S



Web Socket

Web Sockets

HTTP/S



Web Socket




- Both client and server can send/receive data
- This is a persistent connection

Web Sockets

HTTP/S



Web Socket



- Both client and server can send/receive data
- This is a persistent connection


Ad Blockers

Ad Blockers

- Chrome extension **chrome.webRequest** API
 - Extension can inspect / modify / drop outgoing requests

Ad Blockers

- Chrome extension **chrome.webRequest** API
 - Extension can inspect / modify / drop outgoing requests




Ad Blockers

- Chrome extension **chrome.webRequest** API
 - Extension can inspect / modify / drop outgoing requests




Ad Blockers

- Chrome extension **chrome.webRequest** API
 - Extension can inspect / modify / drop outgoing requests




Ad Blockers

- Chrome extension **chrome.webRequest** API
 - Extension can inspect / modify / drop outgoing requests




Ad Blockers

- Chrome extension **chrome.webRequest** API
 - Extension can inspect / modify / drop outgoing requests




Ad Blockers

- Chrome extension **chrome.webRequest** API
 - Extension can inspect / modify / drop outgoing requests




Ad Blockers

- Chrome extension **chrome.webRequest** API
 - Extension can inspect / modify / drop outgoing requests




Ad Blockers

- Chrome extension **chrome.webRequest** API
 - Extension can inspect / modify / drop outgoing requests




Ad Blockers

- Chrome extension **chrome.webRequest** API
 - Extension can inspect / modify / drop outgoing requests




Ad Blockers

- Chrome extension **chrome.webRequest** API
 - Extension can inspect / modify / drop outgoing requests



Ad Blockers

- Chrome extension **chrome.webRequest** API
 - Extension can inspect / modify / drop outgoing requests



AdBlock Evasion

AdBlock Evasion

- Bug in `webRequest API`
 - ws/wss requests did not trigger the API


AdBlock Evasion

- Bug in `webRequest` API
 - ws/wss requests did not trigger the API




AdBlock Evasion

- Bug in `webRequest` API
 - ws/wss requests did not trigger the API




AdBlock Evasion

- Bug in `webRequest API`
 - ws/wss requests did not trigger the API




AdBlock Evasion

- Bug in `webRequest API`
 - ws/wss requests did not trigger the API




AdBlock Evasion

- Bug in `webRequest` API
 - ws/wss requests did not trigger the API



AdBlock Evasion

- Bug in `webRequest API`
 - ws/wss requests did not trigger the API



* Represents when our crawls were done

Data Crawling

Data Crawling

100K websites
sampled from Alexa

Data Crawling



Data Crawling

100K websites
sampled from Alexa

Visit 15
links / website


Collected chains for
all included
resources

This means we know
which resource included
which other resource

Data Crawling




Data Crawling




A&A = Advertising and Analytics
e.g. DoubleClick, Criteo, Adnxs

Data Crawling

This means we know which resource included which other resource



Example Inclusion Tree



A&A = Advertising and Analytics
e.g. DoubleClick, Criteo, Adnxs

Data Crawling

This means we know which resource included which other resource

100K websites sampled from Alexa

Visit 15 links / website

Collected chains for all included resources

Filter WebSockets


Filter all resources which end in web sockets

Detect A&A WebSockets

Mark web sockets which are used by A&A domains


A&A = Advertising and Analytics
e.g. DoubleClick, Criteo, Adnxs

Example Inclusion Tree




Data Crawling

This means we know which resource included which other resource



Example Inclusion Tree



A&A = Advertising and Analytics
e.g. DoubleClick, Criteo, Adnxs

Data Crawling

This means we know which resource included which other resource

100K websites sampled from Alexa

Visit 15 links / website

Collected chains for all included resources

Filter WebSockets

Filter all resources which end in web sockets

Detect A&A WebSockets

Mark web sockets which are used by A&A domains

A&A = Advertising and Analytics
e.g. DoubleClick, Criteo, Adnxs

Example Inclusion Tree

pub/
index.html

ads/
script.js

ads/
frame.html

adnet/
data.ws

WebSocket

High-Level Numbers

High-Level Numbers

**Before
Chrome 58**

Crawl Dates	% Websites with sockets	% Sockets with A&A Initiators	% Sockets with A&A Receivers	#Unique A&A Initiators	#Unique A&A Receivers
Apr 02-05, 2017	2.1	60.6	73.7	75	16
Apr 11-16, 2017	2.4	61.3	74.6	63	18

High-Level Numbers

	Crawl Dates	% Websites with sockets	% Sockets with A&A Initiators	% Sockets with A&A Receivers	#Unique A&A Initiators	#Unique A&A Receivers
Before Chrome 58	Apr 02-05, 2017	2.1	60.6	73.7	75	16
	Apr 11-16, 2017	2.4	61.3	74.6	63	18
After Chrome 58	May 07-12, 2017	1.6	60.2	69.7	19	15
	Oct 12-16, 2017	2.5	63.4	63.7	23	18

High-Level Numbers

	Crawl Dates	% Websites with sockets	% Sockets with A&A Initiators	% Sockets with A&A Receivers	#Unique A&A Initiators	#Unique A&A Receivers
Before Chrome 58	Apr 02-05, 2017	2.1	60.6	73.7	75	16
	Apr 11-16, 2017	2.4	61.3	74.6	63	18
After Chrome 58	May 07-12, 2017	1.6	60.2	69.7	19	15
	Oct 12-16, 2017	2.5	63.4	63.7	23	18

- ~2% websites use web sockets.

High-Level Numbers

	Crawl Dates	% Websites with sockets	% Sockets with A&A Initiators	% Sockets with A&A Receivers	#Unique A&A Initiators	#Unique A&A Receivers
Before Chrome 58	Apr 02-05, 2017	2.1	60.6	73.7	75	16
	Apr 11-16, 2017	2.4	61.3	74.6	63	18
After Chrome 58	May 07-12, 2017	1.6	60.2	69.7	19	15
	Oct 12-16, 2017	2.5	63.4	63.7	23	18

- ~2% websites use web sockets.
- ~61 % sockets are initiated by A&A domains

A&A = Advertising and Analytics
e.g. DoubleClick, Criteo, Adnxs

High-Level Numbers

	Crawl Dates	% Websites with sockets	% Sockets with A&A Initiators	% Sockets with A&A Receivers	#Unique A&A Initiators	#Unique A&A Receivers
Before Chrome 58	Apr 02-05, 2017	2.1	60.6	73.7	75	16
	Apr 11-16, 2017	2.4	61.3	74.6	63	18
After Chrome 58	May 07-12, 2017	1.6	60.2	69.7	19	15
	Oct 12-16, 2017	2.5	63.4	63.7	23	18

- ~2% websites use web sockets.
- ~61 % sockets are initiated by A&A domains
- ~71 % sockets contact an A&A domain

A&A = Advertising and Analytics
e.g. DoubleClick, Criteo, Adnxs

High-Level Numbers

	Crawl Dates	% Websites with sockets	% Sockets with A&A Initiators	% Sockets with A&A Receivers	#Unique A&A Initiators	#Unique A&A Receivers
Before Chrome 58	Apr 02-05, 2017	2.1	60.6	73.7	75	16
	Apr 11-16, 2017	2.4	61.3	74.6	63	18
After Chrome 58	May 07-12, 2017	1.6	60.2	69.7	19	15
	Oct 12-16, 2017	2.5	63.4	63.7	23	18

- ~2% websites use web sockets.
- ~61 % sockets are initiated by A&A domains
- ~71 % sockets contact an A&A domain
- # Initiators drop after Chrome 58 release.

A&A = Advertising and Analytics
e.g. DoubleClick, Criteo, Adnxs

High-Level Numbers

	Crawl Dates	% Websites with sockets	% Sockets with A&A Initiators	% Sockets with A&A Receivers	#Unique A&A Initiators	#Unique A&A Receivers
Before Chrome 58	Apr 02-05, 2017	2.1	60.6	73.7	75	16
	Apr 11-16, 2017	2.4	61.3	74.6	63	18
After Chrome 58	May 07-12, 2017	1.6	60.2	69.7	19	15
	Oct 12-16, 2017	2.5	63.4	63.7	23	18

- ~2% websites use web sockets.
- ~61 % sockets are initiated by A&A domains
- ~71 % sockets contact an A&A domain
- # Initiators drop after Chrome 58 release.
- Small but persistent A&A receivers.

A&A = Advertising and Analytics
e.g. DoubleClick, Criteo, Adnxs

Initiators and Receivers

Initiators and Receivers



Initiators and Receivers



Initiators and Receivers



Initiators and Receivers



Top A&A Initiators

A&A Initiator	#A&A Receivers
facebook	11
google	11
doubleclick	9
youtube	8
addthis	8
hotjar	7
googlesyndication	6
twitter	5
sharethis	4
adnxs	3

Initiators and Receivers



Top A&A Initiators

A&A Initiator	#A&A Receivers
facebook	11
google	11
doubleclick	9
youtube	8
addthis	8
hotjar	7
googlesyndication	6
twitter	5
sharethis	4
adnxs	3

Initiators and Receivers



Top A&A Initiators

A&A Initiator	#A&A Receivers
facebook	11
google	11
doubleclick	9
youtube	8
addthis	8
hotjar	7
googlesyndication	6
twitter	5
sharethis	4
adnxs	3

Top A&A Receivers

A&A Receiver	#A&A Initiators
realtime	27
33across	19
intercom	16
disqus	13
zopim	12
hotjar	11
feedjit	10
lockerdome	8
inspectlet	6
smartsupp	4

Initiators and Receivers



Top A&A Initiators

A&A Initiator	#A&A Receivers
facebook	11
google	11
doubleclick	9
youtube	8
addthis	8
hotjar	7
googlesyndication	6
twitter	5
sharethis	4
adnxs	3

Top A&A Receivers

A&A Receiver	#A&A Initiators
realtime	27
33across	19
intercom	16
disqus	13
zopim	12
hotjar	11
feedjit	10
lockerdome	8
inspectlet	6
smartsupp	4

- **Disqus** provides comment board services.

Initiators and Receivers



Top A&A Initiators

A&A Initiator	#A&A Receivers
facebook	11
google	11
doubleclick	9
youtube	8
addthis	8
hotjar	7
googlesyndication	6
twitter	5
sharethis	4
adnxs	3

Top A&A Receivers

A&A Receiver	#A&A Initiators
realtime	27
33across	19
intercom	16
disqus	13
zopim	12
hotjar	11
feedjit	10
lockerdome	8
inspectlet	6
smartsupp	4

- **Disqus** provides comment board services.
- **Zopim, Intercom, Smartsupp** provide live chat services.

Initiators and Receivers



Top A&A Initiators

A&A Initiator	#A&A Receivers
facebook	11
google	11
doubleclick	9
youtube	8
addthis	8
hotjar	7
googlesyndication	6
twitter	5
sharethis	4
adnxs	3

Top A&A Receivers

A&A Receiver	#A&A Initiators
realtime	27
33across	19
intercom	16
disqus	13
zopim	12
hotjar	11
feedjit	10
lockerdome	8
inspectlet	6
smartsupp	4

- **Disqus** provides comment board services.
- **Zopim, Intercom, Smartsupp** provide live chat services.
- **33across & Lockerdome** are advertising platforms.

Initiators and Receivers



Top A&A Initiators

A&A Initiator	#A&A Receivers
facebook	11
google	11
doubleclick	9
youtube	8
addthis	8
hotjar	7
googlesyndication	6
twitter	5
sharethis	4
adnxs	3


Top A&A Receivers

A&A Receiver	#A&A Initiators
realtime	27
33across	19
intercom	16
disqus	13
zopim	12
hotjar	11
feedjit	10
lockerdome	8
inspectlet	6
smartsupp	4


- **Disqus** provides comment board services.
- **Zopim, Intercom, Smartsupp** provide live chat services.
- **33across & Lockerdome** are advertising platforms.
- **Inspectlet & Hotjar** are session replay services.

Sent Items Over Web Sockets

Sent Items Over Web Sockets




Sent Items Over Web Sockets




- Stateful Identifiers like Cookie and User IDs

Sent Items Over Web Sockets



- Stateful Identifiers like Cookie and User IDs
- Fingerprinting data in ~3.4% WebSockets.
97% is **33across**


Sent Items Over Web Sockets




- Stateful Identifiers like Cookie and User IDs
- Fingerprinting data in ~3.4% WebSockets.
97% is **33across**
- ~1.6% WebSockets sends the entire DOM to
Hotjar, LuckyOrange, TruConversion

Received Items Over Web Sockets


Received Items Over Web Sockets




Received Items Over Web Sockets



Received Items Over Web Sockets



Received Items Over Web Sockets



Ads served from **LockerDome**

Summary

- ~67% of socket connections are initiated or received by A&A domains.
- Major companies like Google, Facebook, Addthis adopted WebSockets. Abandoned after Chrome 58 was released.
- The culprits:
 - **33across** was harvesting fingerprinting data.
 - DOM exfiltration by **HotJar, LuckyOrange, TruConversion**
 - **LockerDome** downloaded URLs to serve ads.
- We need to keep up with the current practices of A&A companies.

Summary

- ~67% of socket connections are initiated or received by A&A domains.
- Major companies like Google, Facebook, Addthis adopted WebSockets. Abandoned after Chrome 58 was released.
- The culprits:
 - **33across** was harvesting fingerprinting data.
 - DOM exfiltration by **HotJar, LuckyOrange, TruConversion**
 - **LockerDome** downloaded URLs to serve ads.
- We need to keep up with the current practices of A&A companies.

Questions?
ahmad@ccs.neu.edu

Backup Slides

Inclusion Chain

DOM Tree

```
<html>
  <body>
    <script src="tracker/script.js" </script>
     </img>

    <script src="ads/script.js" > </script>
    <iframe src="frame.html">
      <html> <body>
        <script src="script_12.js" > </script>
         </img>
      </body> </html>
    </iframe>
  </body>
</html>
```

Source code for ads/script_12.js

```
let ws =
  new WebSocket("ws://adnet/data.ws", ...);
ws.onopen = function (e) {ws.send("...");}
```

Inclusion Tree

