Linking Theorem Proving and Model-Checking with Well-Founded Bisimulation

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Abstract. We present an approach to verification that combines the strengths of model-checking and theorem proving. We use theorem proving to show a bisimulation up to stuttering on a—potentially infinite-state—system. Our characterization of stuttering bisimulation allows us to do such proofs by reasoning only about single steps of the system. We present an on-the-fly method that extracts the quotient induced by the bisimulation, for finite quotients. If our specification is a temporal logic formula, we model-check the quotient. If our specification is a simpler system, we use an equivalence checker to show that the quotient is stuttering bisimilar to the simpler system. We lift the results obtained on the quotient to the original system by showing that the original system is a branching-time refinement of the extracted quotient.

We demonstrate our methodology by verifying the alternating bit protocol. This protocol cannot be directly model-checked because it has an infinite-state space; however, using the theorem prover ACL2, we show that the protocol is stuttering bisimilar to a small finite-state system, which we model-check. We also show that the alternating bit protocol is a refinement of a non-lossy system.

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1 Introduction

We propose an approach to verification that combines the strengths of the model-checking [CE81, QS82, CES86] and the automated theorem proving (*e.g.*, [BM79, GM93]) approaches. We use a theorem prover to reduce an infinite-state (or large finite-state) system to a finite-state system, which we then handle using automatic methods.

The reduction amounts to proving a stuttering bisimulation [BCG88], up to properties of interest. Two states are stuttering bisimilar if they are equivalent up to next-time free CTL^* properties ($CTL^* \backslash X$). We introduce well-founded equivalence bisimulation (WEB), a characterization of stuttering bisimulation that is based on well-founded bisimulation [Nam97]. A proof that a relation is a WEB involves checking that each action of the program preserves the relation. Such single step proofs can be checked by theorem provers more readily than proofs based on the original definition of stuttering bisimulation.

A WEB induces a quotient that is equivalent (up to stuttering) with the original system. The idea is to check the quotient, but constructing the quotient can be difficult because determining if there is a transition between states in the quotient depends on whether there is a transition between some pair of related states in the original system (the number of such pairs may be infinite). Another complication is that the quotient may be infinite-state, but the set of its reachable states may be finite. To address these two concerns, we introduce an on-the-fly algorithm that for a large class of systems automatically extracts the quotient. Once the quotient is extracted, we can model-check it or we can use a WEB equivalence checker to compare it with another system.

We are interested in *mechanical verification*; by this we mean that every step in the proof of correctness (except for meta-theory and mechanical tools) is checked mechanically. The theorem prover we use is ACL2 [KM97]. ACL2 is an extended version of the Boyer-Moore theorem prover [BM79]. ACL2 is based on a first-order, executable logic of total recursive functions with induction. We have implemented a μ-calculus model checker with Büchi automata, a WEB equivalence checker, and the quotient extraction algorithm in ACL2; this allows us to perform all of the verification in ACL2 (this is possible because ACL2 is executable). The ACL2 files used are available upon request from the first author.

We demonstrate our approach by verifying the alternating bit protocol [BSW69]. We chose the alternating bit protocol because it has been used as a benchmark for verification efforts, and since this is the first paper to use WEBs for verifying systems, it makes sense to compare our results with existing work. The alternating bit protocol has a simple description but lengthy hand proofs of correctness (*e.g.*, [BG94]), it is infinite-state, and its specification involves a complex fairness property. We have found it to be surprisingly difficult to verify mechanically; many previous papers verify various versions of the protocol (*e.g.*, [Mil90, CE81, HS96, BG96, MN95]), but all make simplifying assumptions, either by restricting channels to be bounded buffers, by ignoring data, or by ignoring fairness issues.

In the next section, we discuss notation and present the theoretical background, including: the definitions of WEB, quotient structure, and refinement; related theorems are also presented. Due to space limitations, proofs of the theorems are omitted; they will appear in a future paper. We assume that the reader is familiar with the temporal logic CTL^* [EH86]. In Section 3, we present the ACL2 formalization of the alternating bit protocol. In Section 4, we present the proof of correctness and in Section 5, we present concluding remarks and comparisons to other work.

2 Theoretical Background

2.1 Preliminaries

$\mathbb{N}$ denotes the natural numbers, *i.e.*, $\{0, 1, \dots\}$. Function application is denoted by an infix dot "." and is right associative. $\langle Qx : r : b\rangle$ denotes a quantified expression, where Q is the quantifier, x the dummy, r the range of x (true if omitted), and b the body. "Such that" and "with respect to" are abbreviated by "s.t." and "w.r.t.", respectively. The cardinality of a set S is denoted by $|S|$. For a relation R, we write sRw instead of $\langle s, w\rangle \in R$. We write $R(S)$ for the image of S under R, *i.e.*, $R(S) = \{y : \langle \exists x : x \in S : xRy\rangle\}$ and $R|_A$ for R restricted to the set A, *i.e.*, $R|_A = \{\langle a, b\rangle : (aRb) \ \wedge \ (a \in A)\}$. A *well-founded structure* is a pair $\langle W, \prec\rangle$ where W is a set and $\prec$ is a binary relation on W s.t. there are no infinitely decreasing sequences on W, w.r.t. $\prec$. We abbreviate $((s \prec w) \ \vee \ (s = w))$ by $s \preccurlyeq w$. From highest to lowest binding power, we have: parentheses, function application, binary relations (*e.g.*, sBw), equality ($=$) and membership ($\in$), conjunction ($\wedge$) and disjunction ($\vee$), implication ($\Rightarrow$), and finally, binary equivalence ($\equiv$). Spacing is used to reinforce binding: more space indicates lower binding.

Definition 1 *(Transition System)*
A Transition System (TS) is a structure $\langle S, \rightarrow, L, I, AP\rangle$, where S is a non-empty set of states, $\rightarrow \subseteq S \times S$ is the *transition relation* (which must be left total), AP is the set of *atomic propositions*, $L : S \rightarrow 2^{AP}$ is the *labeling function* which maps each state to the subset of atomic propositions that hold at that state, and I is the (non-empty) set of *initial states*. We only consider transition systems with denumerable branching.

Definition 2 *(Well-Founded Equivalence Bisimulation (WEB))*
B is a well-founded equivalence bisimulation on TS $M = \langle S, \rightarrow, L, I, AP\rangle$ iff:

1. B is an equivalence relation on S; and
2. $\langle \forall s, w \in S : sBw : L.s = L.w\rangle$; and
3. There exists a function, $rank : S \times S \rightarrow W$, s.t. $\langle W, \prec\rangle$ is well-founded, and
   $\langle \forall s, u, w \in S : sBw \ \wedge \ s \rightarrow u :$
   $\quad \langle \exists v : w \rightarrow v : uBv\rangle \ \vee$
   $\quad (uBw \ \wedge \ rank.(u, u) \prec rank.(s, s)) \ \vee$
   $\quad \langle \exists v : w \rightarrow v : sBv \ \wedge \ rank.(u, v) \prec rank.(u, w)\rangle\rangle$

We will call a pair $\langle rank, \langle W, \prec\rangle\rangle$ satisfying condition 3 in the above definition, a *well-founded witness*. Note that to prove a relation is a WEB, reasoning about single steps of $\rightarrow$ suffices.

Theorem 1 (cf. [BCG88, Nam97]) *If B is a WEB on TS M and sBw, then for any $CTL^*\backslash X$ formula f, $M, s \models f$ iff $M, w \models f$.*

For an equivalence relation B on TS M, a *quotient structure* M/B (read M "mod" B) can be defined, whose states are the equivalence classes of B and whose transition relation is derived from the transition relation of M. Quotient structures can be much smaller than the original: a bisimulation with finitely many classes induces a finite quotient (of a possibly infinite-state system).

Definition 3 *(Quotient Structure)*
Let $M = \langle S, \rightarrow, L, I, AP\rangle$ be a TS and let B be a WEB on M. The class of state s is denoted by $[s]$. The quotient M/B is the TS $\langle \mathcal{S}, \rightsquigarrow, \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{I}, AP\rangle$, where:

1. $\mathcal{S} = \{[s] \ : \ s \in S\}$; and
2. $\mathcal{L}.C = L.s$, for some s in C (equivalent states have the same label); and
3. $\mathcal{I} = \{[s] \ : \ s \in I\}$; and
4. The transition relation is given by: For $C, D \in \mathcal{S}$, $C \rightsquigarrow D$ iff either
   (a) $C \neq D$ and $\langle \exists s, w : s \in C \wedge w \in D : s \rightarrow w \rangle$, or
   (b) $C = D$ and $\langle \forall s : s \in C : \langle \exists w : w \in C : s \rightarrow w \rangle \rangle$
   (The case distinction is needed to prevent spurious self loops in the quotient, arising from stuttering steps in the original structure.)

Theorem 2 (cf. [Nam97]) *If B is a WEB on TS M, then there is a WEB on the union of M and M/B that relates states from M with their equivalence classes.*

Corollary 1 *For any CTL$^*\backslash X$ formula f, $M, s \models f$ iff $M/B, [s] \models f$.*

2.2 Quotient Extraction

We define a class of functions which we call "representative" functions. As we will see, representative functions allow us to extract finite quotient structures automatically.

Definition 4 *(Representative Function)*
Let $M = \langle S, \rightarrow, L, I, AP \rangle$ be a TS and let B be a WEB on M, with well-founded witness $\langle rank, \langle W, \prec \rangle \rangle$. Let $rep : S \rightarrow S$; then rep is a representative function for M w.r.t. B if for all $s, w \in S$:

1. $sBw \quad \equiv \quad rep.s = rep.w$; and
2. $rep.rep.s = rep.s$; and
3. $rank.(w, rep.s) \preccurlyeq rank.(w, s)$; and
4. $rank.(rep.s, rep.s) \preccurlyeq rank.(s, s)$

Theorem 3 *Let rep be a representative function for TS $M = \langle S, \rightarrow, L, I, AP \rangle$ w.r.t. WEB B. Let $S' = rep(S)$, and let $M' = \langle S', \rightrightarrows, L|_{S'}, rep(I), AP \rangle$, where $s \rightrightarrows u$ iff $\langle \exists v : s \rightarrow v : rep.v = u \rangle$. Then M' is M/B, up to a renaming of states.*

Representative functions are very useful (when they exist) because they identify states that have all of the branching behavior of their class. They allow one to view the quotient as a submodel of the original structure, and they are used in the following on-the-fly algorithm for constructing quotient structures.

Given a representative function, rep, for $M = \langle S, \rightarrow, L, I, AP \rangle$ w.r.t. B, one can construct the quotient structure induced by B if $rep(I)$ is finite and computable, and if for all $s \in S, rep(next.s)$ is finite and computable, where $next.s$ is the set of next states of s (in the original structure). We start by mapping I to $rep(I)$ and then explore the state space, *e.g.*, by a breadth first traversal. Given a state, s, in the induced quotient (recall that s is also a state in the original structure), we compute the set $rep(next.s)$, which is the set of next states of s in the quotient. This process is repeated until no new states are generated. If the set of reachable quotient states is finite, the process will terminate.

2.3 Refinement

In this section, $M = \langle S, \rightarrow, L, I, AP \rangle$ and $M' = \langle S', \rightarrow', L', I', AP' \rangle$. M and M' are *isomorphic* if there is a bijection $f : S \rightarrow S'$ s.t. $s \rightarrow w$ iff $f.s \rightarrow' f.w$, and $f(I) = I'$. M and M' are β-isomorphic if they are isomorphic, β is a subset of both AP and AP', and

L and L' agree when restricted to β, *i.e.*, for any $p \in \beta, p \in L.s$ iff $p \in L'.f.s$ for all s. We say M and M' are WEB if $AP = AP'$ and there are WEBs on M and M' s.t. the quotients induced are AP-isomorphic. M and M' are β-WEB if β is a subset of both AP and AP' and the structures obtained from M and M' by restricting L and L' to β are WEB. If M and M' are AP'-WEB, then we say that M is a *refinement* of M'.

Theorem 4 *(Refinement)*

1. *If M is a refinement of M', then any CTL$^*\backslash X$ formula that holds in M' holds in M.*
2. *If M and M'' are β-isomorphic, M'' is a refinement of M', and AP' is a subset of β, M is a refinement of M'.*

Note that the converse of the first part of the theorem does not hold because AP may be a proper superset of AP'. Refinement in a branching time framework corresponds to refining atomicity in such a way that when the variables introduced for the refinement are hidden, the resulting system and the original system are WEB. Note that refinement depends crucially on stuttering, as pointed out in [Lam80]. We will apply the above theorem by taking an infinite-state system M and creating an isomorphic system M'' in which we've hidden and distorted (see Section 4.2) some variables. Then we'll take the quotient of M'' and hide the variables we've distorted, getting M', which M refines.

3 Protocol

The alternating bit protocol is used to implement reliable communication over faulty channels. We present the protocol from the view of the sender and receiver first and then in complete detail. The sender interacts with the communication system via the register *smsg* and the flag *svalid*. The sender can assign a message to *smsg* provided it is invalid, *i.e.*, *svalid* is false. The receiver interacts with the communication system via the register *rmsg* and the flag *rvalid*. The receiver can read *rmsg* provided it is valid, *i.e.*, *rvalid* is not false; when read, *rmsg* is invalidated. Figure 1 depicts the protocol from this point of view.



Fig. 1. Protocol from sender's and receiver's view

The communication system consists of the flags *sflag* and *rflag* as well as the two lossy, unbounded, and FIFO channels *s2r* and *r2s*. The idea behind the protocol is that the contents of *smsg* are sent across *s2r* until an acknowledgment for the message is received on *r2s*, at which point a new message can be transmitted. Similarly, acknowledgments for a received message are sent across *r2s* until a new message is received. In order for the receiving end to distinguish between copies of the same message and copies of different messages, each message is tagged with *sflag* before being placed on *s2r*. When a new message is received, *rflag* is assigned the value of the message tag and gets sent across *r2s*; this also allows the sending end to distinguish acknowledgments. There may be an arbitrary number of copies of a message (or an acknowledgment) on the channels, and



Fig. 2. Alternating Bit Protocol

it turns out that there are at most two distinct messages (or acknowledgments) on the channels, hence binary flags suffice. Figure 2 depicts the protocol.

The above discussion is informal; a formal description follows, but first we discuss notation. We have formalized the protocol and its proof in ACL2, however, for presentation purposes we describe the formalization using standard notation. We remain faithful to the ACL2 formalization, *e.g.*, we do not use types: functions that appear typed are really under-specified, but total. The concatenation operator on sequences is denoted by ":", but sometimes we use juxtaposition; "ϵ" denotes the empty sequence; $head.s$ is the first element of sequence s; $tail.s$ is the sequence resulting from removing the first element from s; $|s|$ is the size of the sequence. Messages are pairs; *info* returns the first component of a message and *flag* returns the second.

A state is an eight-tuple $\langle sflag, svalid, smsg, s2r, r2s, rflag, rvalid, rmsg\rangle$; *state* is a predicate that recognizes states. The *sflag* of state s is denoted $sflag.s$ and similarly for the other fields. Rules are functions from states into states; they are listed in Table 1 and are of the form $G \to A$; if A is used as a rule, it abbreviates $\mathsf{true} \to A$. Rule $G \to A$ defines the function $(\lambda s$: if $G.s$ then $A.s$ else $s)$. We now define the transition relation, R: sRw iff s is a state and w can be obtained by applying some rule to s.

We have defined the states and transition relation of the alternating bit protocol. The states are labeled with an eight-tuple, as mentioned above. It should be clear that we can convert this type of labeling into a labeling over atomic propositions (boolean variables) by introducing enough—in this case an infinite number of—atomic propositions, therefore, the alternating bit protocol defines a TS, ABP.

Rule	Definition
Skip	skip
Accept.m	$\neg svalid \to smsg, svalid := m, \mathsf{true}$
Send-msg	$svalid \to s2r := s2r : \langle smsg, sflag\rangle$
Drop-msg	$s2r \neq \epsilon \to s2r := tail.s2r$
Get-msg	$s2r \neq \epsilon \wedge \neg rvalid \to$
	if $flag.head.s2r = rflag$
	then $s2r := tail.s2r$
	else $s2r, rmsg, rvalid, rflag := tail.s2r, info.head.s2r, \mathsf{true}, flag.head.s2r$
Send-ack	$r2s := r2s : rflag$
Drop-ack	$r2s \neq \epsilon \to r2s := tail.r2s$
Get-ack	$r2s \neq \epsilon \to$
	if $head.r2s = sflag$
	then $r2s, svalid, sflag := tail.r2s, \mathsf{false}, \neg sflag$
	else $r2s := tail.r2s$
Reply	$rvalid := \mathsf{false}$

Table 1. Rules defining the transition relation

4 Protocol Verification

We give an overview of the verification of the alternating bit protocol. ABP'' is the alternating bit protocol, with some variables distorted. Let β be the set of variables that are not distorted; then ABP and ABP'' are β-isomorphic. We define a relation B and prove that B is an WEB on ABP''. We define *rep*, a representative function on ABP'' w.r.t. B. We use our extraction procedure to extract the structure defined by *rep*. ABP' is this structure, restricted to β. We model-check ABP'; by Theorem 4, ABP is a refinement of ABP' and any $CTL^*\backslash X$ formulae that hold on ABP' also hold on ABP.

We also show that ABP' is WEB to a non-lossy protocol; in many cases such a check is more convincing than model-checking because it shows that one system is a refinement of another.

4.1 Well-Founded Equivalence Bisimulation

In this subsection we define a relation B and outline the ACL2 proof that B is a WEB. We start with some definitions.

For the following definitions, a and b are sequences of length 1, $a \neq b$, and x is an arbitrary finite sequence. The function *compress* acts on sequences to remove adjacent duplicates. Formally,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathit{compress}.\epsilon &= \epsilon & \mathit{compress}.a &= a \\ \mathit{compress}.aax &= \mathit{compress}.ax & \mathit{compress}.abx &= a : \mathit{compress}.bx \end{aligned}$$

The predicate *good-s2r* recognizes sequences that define valid channel contents. Formally,

$$\mathit{good\text{-}s2r}.\epsilon = \mathsf{true} \qquad \mathit{good\text{-}s2r}.ax = (a = \langle \mathit{info}.a, \mathit{flag}.a \rangle) \wedge \mathit{good\text{-}s2r}.x$$

The function *s2r-state* compresses the *s2r* field of a state, except that already received messages at the head of *s2r* are ignored. Formally,

$$\mathit{s2r\text{-}state}.s = \mathit{compress}.\mathit{relevant\text{-}s2r}.(\mathit{s2r}.s, \langle \mathit{rmsg}.s, \mathit{rflag}.s \rangle)$$

where the function *relevant-s2r* is defined by:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathit{relevant\text{-}s2r}.(\epsilon, a) &= \epsilon & \mathit{relevant\text{-}s2r}.(bx, a) &= bx \\ \mathit{relevant\text{-}s2r}.(ax, a) &= \mathit{relevant\text{-}s2r}.(x, a) \end{aligned}$$

The function *r2s-state* compresses the *r2s* field of a state, except that acknowledgements at the head of *r2s* with a flag different from *sflag* are ignored. Formally,

$$\mathit{r2s\text{-}state}.s = \mathit{compress}.\mathit{relevant\text{-}r2s}.(\mathit{r2s}.s, \mathit{sflag}.s)$$

where the function *relevant-r2s* is defined by:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathit{relevant\text{-}r2s}.(\epsilon, a) &= \epsilon & \mathit{relevant\text{-}r2s}.(ax, a) &= ax \\ \mathit{relevant\text{-}r2s}.(bx, a) &= \mathit{relevant\text{-}r2s}.(x, a) \end{aligned}$$

The main idea behind the bisimulation is to relate states that have similar compressed channels—*i.e.*, are equivalent under *s2r-state* and *r2s-state*—and are otherwise identical. We define the bisimulation in terms of rule *rep*:

$$\mathit{good\text{-}s2r}.\mathit{s2r} \quad \rightarrow \quad \mathit{s2r}, \mathit{r2s} := \mathit{s2r\text{-}state}, \mathit{r2s\text{-}state}$$

We now define the bisimulation relation B: sBu iff $rep.s = rep.u$. It is easy to see that B is an equivalence relation. We define *rank*, a function on states as follows: $rank.s = |s2r.s| + |r2s.s|$.

We will show that $\langle rank, \langle \mathbb{N}, < \rangle \rangle$ is a well-founded witness (to be pedantic we can define *rank* so that it has two arguments, as follows: $rank.(u, s) = |s2r.s| + |r2s.s|$) If sBw, sRu, and sBu, then uBw and by rule *Skip*, wRw, therefore, we need only concern ourselves with the case where $\neg sBu$. To show B is a WEB, it suffices to show:

$$sBw \wedge sRu \wedge \neg sBu \;\Rightarrow\; \langle \exists v : wRv : uBv \vee (sBv \wedge rank.v < rank.w) \rangle$$

We break up the proof (that B is a WEB) into the eight cases in Table 2 by expanding R, *i.e.*, by considering all the ways in which s can be related to u. The cases have the form: Rule Lemma; when u or v appear in Lemma they abbreviate the terms Rule.s and Rule.w, respectively. We prove the cases in ACL2.

Rule	Lemma
Accept.m	$sBw \;\Rightarrow\; uBv$
Send-msg	$sBw \wedge \neg sBu \;\Rightarrow\; uBv$
Drop-msg	$sBw \wedge \neg sBu \;\Rightarrow\; (uBv) \vee (sBv \wedge rank.v < rank.w)$
Get-msg	$sBw \wedge \neg sBu \wedge u \neq Drop\text{-}msg.s \;\Rightarrow\; (uBv) \vee (sBv \wedge rank.v < rank.w)$
Send-ack	$sBw \wedge \neg sBu \;\Rightarrow\; uBv$
Drop-ack	$sBw \wedge \neg sBu \;\Rightarrow\; (uBv) \vee (sBv \wedge rank.v < rank.w)$
Get-ack	$sBw \wedge \neg sBu \wedge u \neq Drop\text{-}ack.s \;\Rightarrow\; (uBv) \vee (sBv \wedge rank.v < rank.w)$
Reply	$sBw \;\Rightarrow\; uBv$

Table 2. WEB case analysis

In order to tie up the case analysis, we define a function *step* that takes three states, s, u, and w as arguments. If sBu, *step* returns w, else if $u = A.s$, for A, a rule from Table 1, *step* returns $A.w$, else *step* returns w. Since we proved that B is an equivalence relation, the following theorem implies that B is a WEB (quantification is replaced by the witness function *step*):

$$sBw \wedge sRu \wedge v = step.(s, u, w) \;\Rightarrow\; wRv \wedge (uBv \vee (sBv \wedge rank.v < rank.w))$$

4.2 Quotient Extraction

In this subsection we prove the following ACL2 theorems which show that *rep* is a representative function satisfying the requirements of Theorem 3; hence, the quotient induced by *rep* is isomorphic to the quotient w.r.t. B: $sBw \equiv rep.s = rep.w$, $rep.rep.s = rep.s$, and $rank.rep.s \leq rank.s$. We extract the quotient structure (induced by *rep*) of the alternating bit protocol restricted to binary messages. In the following subsections, we use model-checking and WEB equivalence checking to analyze this structure.

We now have enough machinery to describe how refinement is used in the verification of the alternating bit protocol. *ABP* is the model of the alternating bit protocol in ACL2. ABP'' is *ABP* with *s2r*, *r2s* relabeled by *s2r-state* and *r2s-state*, respectively. B is a bisimulation on ABP'' with well-founded witness $\langle rank, \langle \mathbb{N}, < \rangle \rangle$, s.t. $rank.(u, s) = |s2r.f^{-1}.s| + |r2s.f^{-1}.s|$ (f is the bijection between *ABP* and ABP''; recall that *rank* is defined on states of ABP''). The quotient of ABP'' w.r.t. B is isomorphic to the structure induced by *rep*. ABP' is this structure, with *s2r* and *r2s* hidden. It is ABP'

that we analyze in the next two subsections. By Theorem 4, ABP is a refinement of ABP' and properties of ABP' can be lifted to ABP.

4.3 Model-Checking

We model-check the quotient extracted by the above mentioned procedure, using a μ-calculus model-checker and a fair-CTL to μ-calculus translator, both written in ACL2. We check the following formulae (written in $CTL^* \backslash X$):

1. $AG(sending1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad A(sending1 \quad W \quad rmsg = 1))$
2. $AG(receiving1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad A(receiving1 \quad W \quad delivered1))$
3. $AGEF svalid$ (acceptance of a new message is always eventually possible)

where *sending1*, *receiving1*, and *delivered1* are abbreviations for $svalid \quad \wedge \quad smsg = 1$, $rvalid \quad \wedge \quad rmsg = 1$, and $\neg rvalid \quad \wedge \quad rmsg = 1$, respectively; formulae analogous to 1 and 2 are proved for message 0. All of the above formulae hold on the extracted structure, which is what one would expect. The property $AGAF svalid$ (acceptance of a new message is always eventually guaranteed), however, does not hold without further fairness assumptions.

The liveness properties are as follows. Each property is shown under a set of fairness assumptions on the actions of the process. These are either weak fairness (infinitely often disabled or infinitely often executed) or strong fairness (infinitely often enabled implies infinitely often executed).

1. $AG(sendingNew1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad A(sending1 \quad U \; rmsg = 1))$ (*sendingNew1* represents the sending of a new copy of message 1): This holds under weak fairness on the Send-msg and Reply actions, and strong fairness on the receipt of a new message by the action Get-msg. A similar property holds for message 0.
2. $AGAF svalid$: This holds under the fairness assumptions for the previous property, along with weak fairness on the Send-ack action and strong fairness on the receipt of a new acknowledgment by the action Get-ack.

Since the fairness conditions mention actions, we compose Büchi automata accepting fair paths with the quotient and model-check the resulting structure on fair-CTL formulae which refer both to the propositions of the quotient and the accepting states of the automata.

We use an argument based on bisimulation to derive sufficient conditions for data-independence [Wol86] of the protocol. These are checked in ACL2; as a consequence, the properties shown above for the data domain $\{0, 1\}$ suffice to show similar properties for *arbitrary* data domains.

4.4 Bisimulation Checking

In many cases, the correctness proof is more convincing if we can show that the extracted model is bisimilar to a model that is so simple, it is correct by inspection. In the case of the alternating bit protocol, we can show that the extracted model is bisimilar to a simple, non-lossy version of the protocol, presented in Table 3.

We use a WEB equivalence checker (based on the description in [BCG88]) written in ACL2 to verify that the non-lossy protocol in Table 3 and the extracted protocol are WEB. The main idea is that we create the disjoint union of the transition systems corresponding to the extracted protocol and the non-lossy protocol. The algorithm will compute the

coarsest WEB on a structure; hence, if the initial states of the two systems are in the same class, the two systems are WEB. In computing the coarsest WEB, we examine only *svalid*, *smsg*, *rvalid*, and *rmsg*. Notice that this view is exactly the one presented in Figure 1.

Rule	Definition
Accept.m	$\neg svalid \rightarrow smsg, svalid := m, \mathsf{true}$
Send-msg	$svalid \wedge \neg rvalid \wedge \neg sent \rightarrow rvalid, sent, rmsg := \mathsf{true}, \mathsf{true}, smsg$
Ready	$sent \rightarrow svalid, sent := \mathsf{false}, \mathsf{false}$
Reply	$rvalid := \mathsf{false}$

Table 3. Rules defining the transition relation of the non-lossy protocol

5 Related Work and Conclusions

Among related work, [MN95] prove safety properties of the alternating bit protocol by using Isabelle/HOL to prove that a hand constructed finite-state system contains all of the traces of the alternating bit protocol and then model-check the finite-state system. [HS96] show the correctness of an infinite-state system by using PVS to verify that a simple manually constructed finite-state system is a conservative approximation of the infinite-state system. The work described in this paper improves upon such methods by (i) using a (verified) representative function to *mechanically* construct a quotient, and (ii) using WEBs instead of simulations or trace containment: this allows us to check properties *exactly*, *i.e.*, if a property holds (fails) on the simple system, then it holds (fails) on the original system.

There are several known types of infinite-state systems (*e.g.*, [ACD90, GS92, AJ96, EN95]) for which the model-checking problem is decidable, but these types of systems often turn out to be too specialized for many cases where it is possible to devise finite abstractions. There have been several approaches to automatically verifying the alternating bit protocol: safety properties of such lossy channel systems are decidable [AJ96]; however, in order to construct automatic abstractions that demonstrate liveness properties, most other verifications of the alternating bit protocol (*e.g.*, [GS97]) consider channels to be bounded.

Mechanical verification is necessary. In our case, we managed to convince ourselves that a candidate relation was a WEB for the alternating bit protocol, even though it was not; this became clear only when we tried to prove it mechanically.

An interesting direction for future work is to apply the methodology presented here to the verification of other infinite-state systems (*e.g.*, pipelined and out-of-order execution machines and memory coherence protocols).

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